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THE INFORMATION GAP IN ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
Kirkley S. Coulter*
In a series of cases culminating in the decision of United States
v. Von's Grocery Co. in May, 1966,' the Supreme Court seems to
have embraced a more and more rigidly mathematical approach to
the enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act of 1950.2
In this case no misbehavior on the part of the defendant (or of
anyone else) was charged. The attack went, not to conduct, but
solely to industry structure. The illegality was found by the court
to rest heavily on certain statistical trends which it believed consti-
tuted an increase in "economic concentration" in the Los Angeles
grocery market.
The Celler-Kefauver Act amended Section seven of the Clay-
ton Act so as to make it read in relevant part as follows:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital... of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
for any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly." s
As can be seen, the section deals only with mergers. It does
not touch any other aspect of the antitrust laws. However, the
enforcement actions being brought against mergers under this sec-
tion are in fact the cutting edge of current government antitrust
policy. The new line of enforcement, with its sharp focus on the
purely statistical aspects, makes severe calls on such statistical data
and economic expertise as can be brought to bear.
First, a review of the decision. In 1960 Von's Grocery Com-
pany, a locally-owned Los Angeles grocery chain, undertook to ac-
quire by merger another local Los Angeles grocery chain, Shop-
ping Bag Food Stores. Both firms were major factors in the retail
grocery business in the market comprising Los Angeles and its
suburbs. Von's ranked third in sales volume among grocery chains
in the area and Shopping Bag sixth, with combined sales aggregat-
ing 7.5 percent of the total retail grocery sales of the market.
* Minority Economist, Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee.
' 384 U.S. 270 (1965).
2 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
3 Id.
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Delivering the Court's opinion, Justice Black emphasized heav-
ily the decline which had occurred during recent years in the num-
ber of owners operating a single retail grocery store in the Los
Angeles market. From 5,365 in 1950, the number of such stores
had decreased to 3,818 in 1961 and to 3,590 in 1963.4 This decline
was taken by Justice Black to constitute an increase in economic
concentration. In fact, in a footnote to the opinion he created a
virtual definition of the concept of rising concentration in just
those terms, as "a total decrease in the number of separate competi-
tors .... -5
Next, Justice Black pointed to the number of recent acquisi-
tions and mergers among other grocery chains in the Los Angeles
market, particularly to previous acquisitions by some of the larger
firms (although neither Von's nor Shopping Bag had previously
merged with any of their competitors). The merger of Von's and
Shopping Bag occurred against this background.
These facts were, he said, "alone... enough to cause us to con-
clude that the Von's-Shopping Bag merger did violate [section]
7,"6 for the basic purpose of the 1950 Act was "to prevent economic
concentration in the American economy by keeping a large num-
ber of small competitors in business.17 The economy was believed
to be characterized by "a rising tide of economic concentration."8
Congress intended to preserve competition by arresting this sup-
posed trend toward concentration "in its incipiency."9 The facts of
the Von's Grocery case presented "exactly the threatening trend
toward concentration which Congress wanted to halt," according
to Justice Black.10
Some have treated the Von's Grocery decision as if it broke
radically new ground. Indeed, in his dissent in this case Justice
Stewart argued that the majority's opinion was "contrary not only
to our previous decisions, but contrary to the language of [section]
7, contrary to the legislative history of the 1950 amendment, and
contrary to economic reality."" It was, he said scornfully, "a
simple exercise in sums," which disregard "the economic concen-
tration of the market, the level of competition in the market, or
4 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-73 (1965).
5 Id. at 273 n.3.
6 Id. at 274.
7 Id. at 275.
8 Id. at 276.
9 Id. at 277.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 283 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the potential adverse effects of the merger on that competition.' 2
True, in its heavy reliance on the simple datum of a decline in
the number of grocery firms, Von's Grocery went considerably be-
yond any previous holding by the high Court. Yet much of this
approach was foreshadowed as long ago as 1962, in Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,'5 which for-
bade the merger of Brown Shoe Company, a manufacturer with
some retail outlets, and G. R. Kinney, primarily a retail shoe chain.
In that opinion the Chief Justice, not once but twice, referred to
the "rising tide of concentration" that he thought was occurring
throughout the economy. The opinion also referred to the decline
which had occurred in the number of shoe manufacturing com-
panies, although the decision was not made to rest specifically on
that fact. However, the opinion did object directly to the fact that
in some individual towns and cities, Brown, by adding the Kinney
retail outlets to its own, would come into control of what the court
considered too great a share of the retail market in those various
towns and cities. "If a merger achieving 5% control (of the retail
sales in a city) were now approved, we might be required to ap-
prove future merger efforts by Brown's competitors seeking similar
market shares," 14 the Court said.
The significance of the Von's Grocery decision is pointed up by
the fact that the Federal Trade Commission has moved to imple-
ment it by announcing broad guidelines as to what scale of mergers
in the food distribution industry are permissible in the Commis-
sion's eyes.15 Mergers by grocery chains involving annual sales of
over 500 million dollars "raise sufficient questions regarding their
legal status to warrant attention and consideration by the Commis-
sion.... ." and likewise for voluntary and cooperative groups doing
a comparable volume of business in the food field.1 6 Those with
annual sales of between 100 and 500 million dollars raise less ques-
tion unless they involve competitive overlap in particular local
markets, but even so they will be subject to semi-automatic com-
mission investigation.
In an unprecedented move the commission also imposed a re-
quirement for a pre-merger notification to itself by any company
12 Id. at 282-83 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
13 370 U.S. 294 (1961).
14 Id. at 343-44.
15 "Enforcement Policy with respect to Mergers in the Food Distribution
Industries," announcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 1 TRADE
REG. REP. fT 4520 (1967).
16 Id.
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fitting any of the above specifications, such notification to be given
sixty days prior to the consummation of a projected merger acqui-
sition.17
This writer is an economist, not a lawyer. In these and other
decisions it is apparent that the Court has been operating on the
basis of certain premises regarding trends and developments be-
lieved to characterize the nation's economic structure. Evidently
the Court's decisions have been powerfully shaped by these prem-
ises.
Some of these premises appear to be the following:
1. The American competitive system ought to be, so far as pos-
sible, comprised of numerous, principally small producers in each
industry or line of commerce.
2. During the present period the economy is characterized by
a "rising tide of economic concentration."
3. In this context, the definition of increased economic concen-
tration is simply a decline in the number of firms.
4. This assumed trend toward concentration has been caused at
least partly by the large number of mergers among corporations;
although the court has nowhere said so, presumably it must be be-
believed that blocking the mergers will check the trend toward
concentration, if such a trend exists.
To what degree do these premises accurately reflect the factual
situation? Clearly some of them are value judgments, not sus-
ceptible to proof or testing. For the most part, however, they are
based on statistical data or economic reasoning. A true judgment,
based on facts rather than emotion or prior ideological leanings,
should be possible in some cases.
During the past three years the Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee has engaged in a
rather extensive study of the general topic of economic concentra-
tion in several of its aspects. Five substantial volumes of hear-
ings have been compiled.18 In addition, there have been made
available voluminous statistical tabulations prepared by the United
States Census Bureau, which have attempted to define the extent
17 Id.
18 At this writing four of the volumes have been published as Hearings on
Economic ConcentrationwBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monop-
oly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., and
89th Cong., 1st Sess., Pts. 1-4 (1964 & 1965). The fifth volume will
appear shortly. See also REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS PRE-
PARED FOR THE SUBCOMiV. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE
Covnm. ON THE JuDIcIARY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., CoNcENTATIOx RATIOS
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1963, Pt. 1 (Comm. Print 1966). [Here-
inafter cited as REPORT OF mE CENSUS BUREAU].
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of concentration found to exist in the various manufacturing in-
dustries. Despite such laborious delving, most of the questions re-
lating to this topic remain unanswered, understandably so. Yet the
facts permit categorical conclusions on some points.
To begin with, among experts and students in this field there
is now substantial agreement on exactly what is meant by the
term "economic concentration." It relates to the situation in which
a large share of an industry (or of a market for a product or group of
products) is controlled by a limited number of firms. Let us pick
an example at random. According to the Census Bureau, of the
total value of shipments in 1963 by the industry designated "or-
ganic fibers, noncellulosic" (SIC 2824), ninety-four percent was
shipped by the four largest companies in the industry. If the calcu-
lation is extended to include the eight largest companies these
eight accounted for ninety-nine percent; the twenty largest com-
panies accounted for 100 percent of the total. These percentage
figures are referred to as the four-firm, eight-firm, or twenty-firm
"concentration ratios" respectively for the industry. 9
From such a high figure of concentration, four-firm concentra-
tion ratios range all the way down to such levels as thirty-one per-
cent for meat slaughtering plants (SIC 2011) ,20 eleven percent for
logging camps and contractors (SIC 2411) ,21 and five percent for
fur goods (SIC 2371) .22
It is unfortunate that in his decision in Von's Grocery, Justice
Black chose to focus his argument on the mere number of grocery
firms. In so doing he revealed his own economic predilections
rather than any useful analysis of the realities of economic compe-
tition. If several thousand small food stores are replaced by several
hundred grocery supermarkets in Los Angeles or anywhere else,
it does not indicate any lessening of competition, which may be-
come more vigorous than ever. As well might it be argued that
farming is becoming a concentrated industry on the ground that
the number of farms in the United States has declined from
7,000,000 in 1935 to 3,300,000 today.
A larger business unit in both food retailing and farming has
come to predominate because of the movement of vast economic
19 Under some circumstances the measurement may be made, not in terms
of value of shipments, but in terms of the percentage of "value added
by manufacture," or of employment, total assets, or some other meas-
ure of size. REPORT OF THE CENsus BuREAu, supra note 18, at 81.
20 Id. at 42.
21 Id. at 66.
22 Id. at 63.
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forces, but that does not mean that competition has become any
less vigorous. Justice Black seeks to halt the supermarket revolu-
tion by judicial fiat, but as a matter of fact it was not the chains
which accomplished the displacement of the Mom and Pop corner
groceries. It was the independent grocers who led the way in es-
tablishing supermarkets and thereby displaced their fellow inde-
pendents who operated smaller stores. If the Justice could block
all the mergers, and dissolve all the chains, even by that means he
could not resurrect the multitude of tiny stores that have passed
away.
The definition of concentration, then, is not based on mere
number of firms. As noted above, for the specialists in this
field the term relates to percentage share controlled by a few
firms, in other words, to a concentration ratio. The overwhelm-
ing preponderance of this view is reflected in the pages of the hear-
ings held by the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee. Numer-
ous witnesses, lawyers, and other experts as well as economists, tes-
tified on economic concentration, its causes and results, its signifi-
cance, the discernible trends. They represented the entire spec-
trum of political, economic, and legal views on this topic. Not
one stressed the decline in mere numbers of firms as a measure of
concentration; in fact, so far as I can recall, none even mentioned it
at all.
The difference in concept is crucial. A reduction in the num-
ber of firms has no relationship to the question of concentration,
unless so few are left that the market comes under some form of
control. If the market for any product falls under the domination
of a limited number of firms, the danger is that they may con-
sciously or unconsciously fall into practices inconsistent with free
competition. Even absent any conspiracy to restrain trade by fix-
ing prices or the like, there may still be at least a possibility that
the few powerful firms will refrain from energetic competitive
tactics to avoid inviting retaliation or otherwise "spoiling the mar-
ket." But clearly this danger will not arise merely because of a
decline in numbers of competitors, provided only that a sufficient
number remain.
In his opinion in Brown Shoe, Chief Justice Warren made
particular reference to a "rising tide of economic concentration"
which he considered to be under way at this time. This phrase in
the Warren opinion was quoted with approval by Justice Black in
Von's Grocery.23 It is apparent that this idea-that American
23 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1965), citing
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1961).
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markets and industries are falling more and more under concen-
trated control, which must be checked somehow-has underlaid the
Court's philosophy in recent years, and explains much about some
of its decisions.
Now, the interesting fact is that the data completely fails to
support this belief. In fact, the statistics strongly indicate that
there has been no trend whatever, either upward or downward, in
industry concentration generally. 4 This statement is based on
analysis of data prepared for the Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
committee by the Census Bureau, consisting of concentration ratios
for the various manufacturing industries according to the Standard
Industrial Classification for each of the years 1947, 1954, 1958, and
1963. The calculations for 1963 have been available only since last
fall (1966).
It must be explained that for many industries no comparison
is possible between two different years, because of a change in the
definition of the industry between the two dates. Of the 416 manu-
facturing industries identified in 1963, a comparison could be made
with 1947 (in a few cases, only with 1954) in somewhat over half
the industries.
The data can be analyzed in various ways. One method is
shown in Table I. Table I presents a simple tabulation showing
the number of industries of which the four-firm concentration ratio
(that is, the share of total shipments of the industry accounted for
by the four largest companies) fell within the percentage brackets
shown in the table. For example, the table shows that for 1947
there were twenty of the 219 industries in which the four largest
firms accounted for eighty percent or more of total shipments,
while for 1963 this was the case for only seventeen of the same in-
dustries.
24 In this portion of the discussion attention is focused on "industry con-
centration," that is, the degree of concentration in the various indus-
tries, each taken separately. It is this concept which has to do with
the possible danger of controlled markets and monopolization. A
somewhat unrelated concept sometimes termed "overall concentration,"
having to do with the percentage share in the total national economy
occupied by the 50, 100, 200, etc. largest corporations, is dealt with in
passing at the conclusion of this paper.
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Table 1.25
Number of Industries having Four-firm Concentration Ratios within
Specified Percentage Brackeis, 1963 compared with 1947
Percentage of Number of Industries Number of Industries
Concentration Cumulative
1947 1963 1947 1963
80-100 20 17 20 17
70-79 13 13 33 30
60-69 14 18 47 48
50-59 28 28 75 76
40-49 26 19 101 95
30-39 31 44 132 139
20-29 42 37 174 176
10-19 31 34 205 210
0-9 14 9 219 219
It should be noted that the same industries are included in
both years; all industries for which a comparison between 1947
and 1963 is shown in the source were included in the tabulation.
If for a particular industry the concentration ratio for 1947 was
lacking but the ratio for 1954 was available, the latter was used
instead. For a number of the industries value added by manufac-
ture was used rather than value of shipments because the latter
contained a substantial and unmeasurable amount of duplication.
For a few industries value of production was used rather than
value of shipments. In any case, the source was followed each
time.
For a few industries the concentration ratio had been with-
held by the Census Bureau to avoid disclosing figures for indi-
vidual companies. Since practically all of such industries were in
the higher concentration ranges, their omission might have seri-
ously misrepresented the profile by understating the number of
industries in such higher ranges. For that reason estimates based
on information believed to be reliable were made of concentration
ratios as follows:
2814 Cyclic (coaltar) crudes, 1963-80-100 percent 26
2822 Synthetic rubber, 1947-80-100 percent27
3334 Primary aluminum, 1963-80-100 percent 28
3492 Safes and vaults, 1963-80-100 percent2 9
3636 Sewing machines, 1963-80-100 percent30
3723 Aircraft propellers and parts, 1963-80-100 percent$'
For two industries, primary lead and dolls, on which the Cen-
sus Bureau withheld the figures because of the disclosure rule, no
25 REPORT Op THE CENsus BUREAu, supra note 18, at 6-41.
26 Id. at 79.
27 Id. at 81.
28 Id. at 98.
29 Id. at 105.
80 Id. at 118.
3' Id. at 124.
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estimate was possible and they have been omitted from the above
tabulation.32
Evidently the changes which have occurred in the profile
as a whole over the entire sixteen-year period have not been
great. The overall picture is one of relative stability, with any in-
creases having apparently been offset by an equal or greater num-
ber of decreases. There has been some decline in the number of
highly-concentrated industries (eighty to one hundred percent), but
also a decrease in the number of less-concentrated ones (under
twenty percent), with a resulting slight "bunching" in the middle
brackets. However, on the whole the changes have not been great
or particularly significant.
Table II presents a tabulation of the changes, industry by in-
dustry, over the 16-year period. Again it can be seen that there
has been no marked trend, either upward or downward. Of the
215 industries for which comparison can be made, an increase in
the four-firm concentration ratio occurred in 103 industries, a de-
crease in exactly 100 industries. It is practically a tie ball game.
Similarly, when the minor changes (less than five percentage
points) are excluded, there still remain practically equal numbers
of increases and decreases, sixty-eight and sixty-four.
TABLE 11.33
Number of industries having increases and decreases in four-firm
concentration ratio based on value of shipments, 1947-63,
by industry grouping
Industry grouping Change In concentration ratio, 1947-63
Total Number with Number with
Number increases decreases
of 5 Less No Less 5
Indus- percent than change than percent
tries or more 5 percent 5 percent or more
Total 215 68 35 12 36 64
Food and kindred products 26 12 4 - 4 6
Tobacco manufactures 4 1 - - 1 2
Textile mill products 14 5 5 1 1 2
Apparel and related products 21 6 7 2 3 3
Lumber and wood products 5 2 2 - 1 -
Furniture and fixtures 6 1 1 - - 4
Paper and allied products 3 - 1 - - 2
Printing and publishing 10 3 1 1 2 3
Chemicals and allied products 15 1 2 - 5 7
Petroleum and coal products 5 1 - 1 2 1
Rubber and plastic products,
n.e.c. 2 1 - - - 1
Leather and leather products 6 1 2 - 1 2
82 Id. at 97, 130.
as Id. at 6-41.
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 639
Stone, clay and glass products 16 6 3 1 4 2
Primary metal industries 8 3 1 2 - 2
Fabricated metal products 12 2 - - 2 8
Machinery 13 3 1 1 5 3
Electrical machinery 13 3 2 1 3 4
Transportation equipment 9 4 1 1 1 2
Instruments and related products 5 2 1 - 1 1
Miscellaneous manufacturing 22 11 1 1 - 9
All industries were included for which a comparison was pos-
sible between 1947 and 1963 or lacking that, between 1954 and
1963. Industries included are the same as those for Table I, ex-
cept in four cases where the lack of data because of the disclosure
rule prevented a comparison.
For the information of the reader the breakdown is presented
by major industry groups. It is interesting to note, for example,
that in the chemical and allied products group, decreases in the
four-firm concentration ratio occurred in twelve industries, in
seven of them by five percentage points or more, as compared with
only three increases in this group. By contrast, among the apparel
and related products industries there were increases in thirteen
industries and decreases in only six.
Evidently this table likewise demonstrates the absence of any
strongly marked trend, either upward or downward. What is also
interesting to note is the considerable number of substantial
changes, both upward and downward, in individual industries.
For almost two-thirds of the industries there have been changes
of five percentage points or more, either upward or downward.
Although the profile as a whole has maintained approximately the
same height, the peaks and valleys within that general profile
have moved substantially in some cases. Evidently the picture is
one of considerable diversity and flexibility within the economic
system, showing that the various industries have great capacity
for adjustment to changing conditions.
Since principal interest is sometimes focused on the more con-
centrated industries, Table III presents a listing of all those show-
ing a four-firm concentration ratio of seventy-five percent or more
in any one of the four years for which data are available. Of the
twenty-nine industries included in the list, eighteen showed a
smaller concentration ratio in 1963, while only ten showed an in-
crease. Furthermore, by 1963 only seventeen or eighteen had
concentration ratios of seventy-five or more, whereas in 1947 at
least twenty-one (and probably more) had fallen in that bracket.
In many cases these declines in concentration were substan-
tial. The share of the largest four cigarette producers fell from
ninety to eighty percent. For the distilled liquor industry, the per-
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centage share declined from seventy-five to fifty-eight. For to-
bacco stemming and redrying, the ratio declined from eighty-eight
to seventy; for pressed and molded pulp goods, from eighty-six to
seventy-two; for industrial gases, from eighty-three to seventy-
two; for rubber footwear, from eighty-one to sixty-two; for pho-
nograph records, from seventy-nine to sixty-nine. Of the indus-
tries showing increased concentration ratios, in only four cases
did the increase amount to ten percentage points or more: chew-
ing gum, household laundry equipment, primary batteries, and
motor vehicles.
These declines in concentration in a majority of the highly
concentrated industries doubtless will come as a surprise to some.
Equally noteworthy is the fact that in no case were these de-
clines caused by governmental action of an antitrust nature. They
must have occurred as a natural result of the competitive forces in
the free market. There is no other explanation.
Table II.84
Percent of value of shipments accounted for by the four largest companies
in each manufacturing industry: 1963 compared with 1947, 1954, and 1958:
All industries having concentration ratios of 75 percent or more in any one
of the four years.
SIC Concentration Ratio
number Industry 1947 1954 1958 1963
2043 Cereal preparations 79 88 83 86
2046 Wet corn milling 77 75 73 71
2072 Chocolate and Cocoa products 68 70 71 75
2073 Chewing gum 70 86 89 90
2085 Distilled liquor, except brandy 75 64 60 58
2111 Cigarettes (1) 90 82 79 80
2141 Tobacco stemming and redrying (1) 88 79 73 70
2646 Pressed and molded pulp goods 86 72 69 72
2813 Industrial gases 83 84 79 72
2822 Synthetic rubber (D)(2) 53 60 57
2892 Explosives 80 79 77 72
3021 Rubber footwear 81 72 65 62
3031 Reclaimed rubber 84 73 87 93
3211 Flat glass (3) 90 92 94
3275 Gypsum products 85 90 88 84
3313 Electrometallurgical products 88 77 73 79
3331 Primary copper (4) (3) (3) 87 78
3334 Primary aluminum 100 100 (D) (D)
3411 Metal cans 78 80 80 74
3572 Typewriters 79 83 79 76
3612 Transformers 73 78 71 68
3624 Carbon and graphite products 87 86 87 83
3633 Household laundry equipment 40 68 71 78
3641 Electric lamps 92 93 92 92
3652 Phonograph records 79 70 76 69
84 Id.
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3661 Telephone; telegraph apparatus (4) (3) 90 92 92
3692 Primary batteries, dry and wet 76 78 84 89
3717 Motor vehicles and parts (4) 56 75 75 79
3741 Locomotives and parts 91 91 95 97
(D) Withheld to avoid disclosing figures for individual companies.
(1) Value of production shown for this industry rather than value
of shipments.
(2) At least 80 percent, since there were only five companies in
this industry in 1947.
(3) Comparable data are not available because of significant
changes in the plants or products in this industry.
(4) Value added by manufacture is shown for this industry rather
than value of shipments because the latter contains a substantial
and unmeasurable amount of duplication.
Apparently it has been widely believed that when an industry
becomes concentrated, the large firms in that industry have power
commensurate with their size, and can thereby dominate price and
production policies in the market for that line of products. By this
line of reasoning surely it would be supposed that the large firms
would use such market power to increase their respective shares of
the market.
Evidently our data indicate pretty clearly that any such theory
is fallacious. The dominant firms in the concentrated industries
have been unable to increase their dominance in most cases. The
level of concentration has not changed greatly in most cases; but
to the extent that it has, concentration ratios have gone down in-
stead of up. More often than not the smaller firms have gained
at the expense of the larger ones, to at least a limited degree.
Evidently there are competitive forces of great strength in our
markets, sufficient in many cases to wear away the leading posi-
tions of the industrial giants.
From the foregoing it would appear that the courts have been
proceeding on the basis of serious misapprehensions as to the na-
ture of the dominant trends in our economy. Both Justice Black
and Chief Justice Warren in their opinions have inveighed against
a "rising tide" of economic concentration. Evidently they see
themselves as obligated to battle against this supposed menace to
the free competition in our markets. Probably the same was true
of many members of Congress who supported enactment of the
Anti-Merger Act in 1950.
Since then, massive tabulations of data by the Census Bureau
for three benchmark years-1954, 1958, and 1963-have given us
much more exact data on the trends in concentration, industry
by industry, than ever before. As shown above, these data
have made it clear that no such rising tide exists.
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It seems in short that there has been a strange sort of gap
between the facts, and the cognition of those facts on the part of
the judges and others charged with interpreting and enforcing the
law. The facts are there, available to public knowledge. But a
majority of the justices have continued to harbor a mental picture
of the problem which is inconsistent with those facts.
How has it happened that this faulty picture of a rising tide
of concentration has gained such wide currency? Without doubt it
is due partly to the erroneous linkage in the public mind of a high
volume of mergers with an increase in concentration. It is true
that the number of industrial mergers in recent years has been
large. The public sees that mergers are common, and perhaps
jumps to the conclusion that market control must be passing into
fewer and fewer hands. But the consummation of a merger does
not automatically mean an increase in concentration.
To understand how this can be, let it be noted that in the oil
industry, for example, much of the new discovery of producing
structures is accomplished by independents, "wild-catters," which
then sell their discoveries to the major companies in many cases.
Thus, mergers in this industry are frequent at the producing level,
but the independents thereby gain the funds to carry on further
exploration activities for new reserves. Competition is maintained
and even enhanced by the very ease with which independent ex-
ploration companies may sell out their producing properties to the
majors.
For another example of increased competition occurring simul-
taneously with merger activity, look at the transportation industry.
The rapid growth of bus lines, trucking services, airlines, and
other modes of commercial transportation to say nothing of the use
of privately-owned cars has greatly broadened the extent of com-
petition in this field which half a century ago or less was totally
dominated by the railroads. This has occurred despite a consid-
erable amount of merger activity within the railroad field, and
among other transportation facilities also. Evidently merger ac-
tivity need not mean a diminution of competition at all if new
growth is simultaneously occurring outside the merged facilities.
To return now to the trend of recent court decisions, when
judgments are handed down on the basis of faulty premises, the
results are unlikely to be salutary. In this matter of enforcing
the Anti-Merger Act, the preoccupation of the judiciary with the
supposed threat of constantly rising concentration has helped cre-
ate an attitude of mind unfriendly to almost any merger. Any
excuse to say "no" seems good enough. As Justice Stewart said
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in his dissent to Von's Grocery, "the sole consistency that I can
find is that in litigation under [section] 7, the Government always
Wins."35
If one starts firmly believing in a premise that the ocean tide
is rising, then each incoming wave may seem to lend substance to
that belief. Similarly, each individual merger like each wave on
the ocean may seem to make up part of a tide of economic concen-
tration presumably rising. But when a little time has passed and
it is seen that the level of water is no higher than it was before
after all, it becomes clear that the incoming movement of the
waves must have been counterbalanced by an unseen flow of the
waters outward. Judgment can then replace morbid fears, and
the whole movement of events can be viewed in a healthier frame
of mind.
Well, it may be asked, even if some harmless mergers are un-
necessarily blocked, is any great harm done thereby? Do mergers
make any positive contribution to our social well-being anyhow?
The answer to both questions is yes. Simply put, the making of
mergers is an essential part of the flexibility of our economy. To
forbid all mergers hereafter would mean freezing in place the in-
dustrial structure of the present moment, that is, the firms that
now exist and their present roles in the business flow.
But the economy changes, and business firms must change
with it. Suppose a man who has built up a successful business
wishes to retire. Or suppose he dies. In many situations the sale
of the dominant stock holding in a corporation by its owner to a
larger corporation-in other words, a merger-is the normal mode
of making an exit from a business. Frequently it is not possible
to sell such a stock holding at all, except to a larger corporation.
In discussions of this topic, much is commonly made of the import-
ance of "ease of entry" into an industry by outside firms, as a
means of preserving competition in that industry. But "ease of
exit" would seem to be of equal importance in a case such as this.
To mention another aspect, the merger process may be
the means by which able, agressive executives come into manage-
ment control of a larger quantum of the nation's industrial assets.
If the dynamic quality of our economy is to be preserved, oppor-
tunity must be maintained for new men to rise through the ranks
into positions of industrial leadership. To block off such men from
expanding the corporations they control would be to protect the
old established industrial leadership from the challenge of the new-
comers.
35 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1965).
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In short, the process of merging among businesses needs to be
viewed as occupying a necessary place in the flow of economic ac-
tivity. Certainly it should be subjected to surveillance against
abuse, but it should not be treated with automatic hostility and
criticism.
Earlier a reference was made to the concept known as "overall
concentration," relating to the percentage of the total business of
the nation (or perhaps merely the total of all manufacturing) held
or controlled by a limited number of large firms-50, 100, or 200.
This concept should play no part in antitrust enforcement. In fact, it
has no real relevance to the competitive process in a direct sense.
Competition has to do with the rivalry in a particular market among
a number of buyers or sellers of a particular product or product line,
each being intent on gaining for himself a large share of the busi-
ness. Competition will almost always remain vigorous whenever
such a particular market is not dominated by a very few partici-
pants.
The concept of overall concentration, however, does not concern
itself with particular markets or particular products. Although this
concept has not yet been brought into any antitrust enforcement
proceeding, it has received a good deal of attention in the literature
during the last few years. For that reason a few comments may
be of interest.
Data compiled by the Census Bureau and published by the
Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee3 6 show that in 1963,
twenty-five percent of the total value added by manufacture of the
nation was accounted for by the fifty largest companies, and forty-
one percent by the 200 largest. Both figures represented increases
from a few years previously. In 1954 the fifty largest had ac-
counted for twenty-three percent, and in 1947, for seventeen per-
cent. However, data was also presented to the subcommittee indi-
cating that the figure for 1947 was abnormally low, and that dur-
ing the 1930's the percentage share of the fifty largest companies
was in about the same range as during the late fifties and early
sixties. If this indication is correct, it would mean that there has
been very little change in the degree of overall concentration in
over thirty years, or at most only a slight increase.
What significance should be attached to these data is hard to
say. Some have used the figures as a basis for projecting into the
future, and thereby for creating a picture of the horrifying conse-
quences that await us in a few years, if present trends continue.
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Thus, one witness before the Subcommittee said: "At this rate of
increase, by 1975 the 200 largest corporations would control two-
thirds of the total assets of American manufacturing corporations." 37
But the passage of time sometimes shows such projections to be ill-
founded. Thus, prophets of an earlier generation, in a landmark
book published in 1935 had this to say about the shape of the
future:
Just what does this rapid growth of the big companies promise for
the future? Let us project the trend of the growth of recent years.
If the wealth of the large corporations and that of all corporations
should each continue to increase for the next 20 years at its average
annual rate for the 20 years from 1909 to 1920, 70 percent of all
corporate activity would be carried on by 200 corporations by 1950.
If the more rapid rates of growth from 1924 to 1929 were main-
tained for the next 20 years 85 percent of corporate wealth would
be held by 200 huge units.8
Needless to say, 1950 came and went without the country having
to experience the dire conditions foreseen by these prophets. In-
stead of increasing, it seems that the share of wealth owned by
those 200 largest corporations probably decreased during the period
cited in the quotation. So the use of predictions-or even of "pro-
jections" surrounded by careful caveats-must be accounted a risky
business.
Should government policy be interposed to deal with the ques-
tion of a supposed increase in overall concentration? Certainly if
there has been an increase, it has been at a speed hardly exceeding
that of a glacial drift. Nor has there been any showing of the need
for such action, or of the kind of action required. As noted above,
there is no definable relationship between overall concentration
and the problems of competition in the market-place. Doubtless the
problem of overall concentration is worthy of further study, but at
this time it must be said that the topic does not appear to present the
occasion for positive government policy of any sort.
37 Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 519.
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